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The collaboration of theoretical pragmaticians and psychologists of 
language has been of benefit to all parties. Linguistic phenomena have 
been a fruitful domain for psychological study, and the empirical data 
gathered in connection with these phenomena have provided theory-
critical evidence beyond the reach of reflective intuition.  In this review, 
we focus in particular on questions concerning the locus of scalar 
implicatures and their intrusion into the truth-conditions of the 
utterance, and on the use of generalised and ad hoc scales in drawing 
scalar inferences. We aim to demonstrate the utility of experimental 
approaches to these questions. 
 
1. Introduction 
Interest in experimental pragmatics has intensified in recent years, as 
indicated by the burgeoning literature in linguistic and psychological 
journals, and the growing interest in international collaborations, as 
exemplified by the Euro-Xprag European Science Foundation network 
grant (see www.euro-xprag.org, Noveck, Geurts & Sauerland 2009). 
Numerous topics have recently been approached from this 
interdisciplinary perspective: these include reference, speech act, 
metaphor and figurative language.  Recent studies on these aspects of 
language, initially motivated by theoretical linguistic considerations, 
have generated plentiful psycholinguistic data.  In many cases, these 
data have enabled researchers not only to settle linguistic debates but 
also contribute to more general models of human cognition. 
One particularly promising line of investigation concerns scalar 
implicature.  As discussed by Katsos and Cummins (2010), this 
phenomenon is especially amenable to empirical study.  There is 
widespread agreement among theoretical accounts of the 
interpretation of scalar terms, and consequently the predictions that 
discriminate between these accounts are subtle and fine-grained.  
Chierchia (2004), Levinson (2000) and Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) 
concur that this renders empirical investigation a more appropriate 
means of evaluating these predictions than using the traditional tools 
of the theoretical linguist, introspection and intuition.  Their 




theoretical accounts of implicature are consequently tailored to this 
form of investigation, exhibiting a conceptual clarity and precision 
which makes it possible to draw testable predictions from the 
theories. Furthermore, the proliferation of research on scalar 
implicatures reflects the importance of this topic to key questions in 
psycholinguistics. Theories of scalar implicature typically make claims 
about the locus of implicature, the role of context and time-course of 
integrating contextual information, and the relation between 
contextually-recovered and grammatically-encoded meaning. These 
claims have implications for the organisation of the entire semantic-
pragmatic system. 
This paper focuses on two aspects of scalar implicature. One of 
these is the distinction between generalised and non-generalised 
scales, and the implications of this for SI generation. The other is the 
locus of generation of scalar implicatures (whether they are drawn 
globally or locally), and their interaction with the truth-conditions of 
the utterance. The general issue of whether scalar implicatures are 
defaults is pursued in Katsos & Cummins (2010). Again, we hope to 
draw wider conclusions about the methodological basis for 
associating linguistic claims with experimental findings. First, 
however, we briefly review the linguistic phenomena. 
2. Implicatures drawn from generalised and ad hoc scales 
Accounts of scalar implicature differ in the extent to which they posit 
a difference between generalised and particularised conversational 
implicatures (GCIs and PCIs respectively).  GCIs rely on the existence 
of a lexical scale of informativeness, such as <like, love, adore>, 
consisting of terms that are equally lexicalised but convey different 
strengths of information.  The use of one term on such a scale conveys 
the implicature that the stronger terms of the scale do not hold.   
By contrast, PCIs effectively rely on a context-specific ad hoc scale 
of informativeness which is typically not lexicalised in the same way.  
For instance, if you are asked whether you have been to America and 
Canada, and reply “I’ve been to America”, you convey the implicature 
that you have not been to Canada, as otherwise you would have said 
“I’ve been to America and Canada”.  This can be analysed as a PCI 
arising from the ad hoc scale <{America}, {America and Canada}>. 
Unlike the lexical informativeness scale discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, this is a temporary, non-lexically-encoded, context-specific 
scale, permitting an inference to be drawn only in this specific 
conversational setting.  
According to default accounts, this means that GCIs are available 
for default computation in the absence of contextual information, 




while PCIs are not. These accounts tend to predict that GCIs are 
rapidly and automatically calculated, and may require extra effort for 
cancellation: for instance, Levinson (2000) proposes that GCIs are 
derived by special pragmatic processes developed to maximise the 
speed of communication, while Chierchia (2004) calls for these 
inferences to be added in as soon as possible and without contextual 
interference. PCIs are only generated when contextually necessary, 
and this is generally considered to be an effortful process. 
By contrast, other accounts collapse the distinction between GCIs 
and PCIs, and propose that the same pragmatic principles are 
responsible for the derivation of both kinds of implicature.  
Hirschberg (1991) argues for the existence of a range of scales 
encoding various types of relation (including part/whole, instance-of, 
etc.), and consequently holds the lexical scales underpinning GCIs to 
be salient but unexceptional. Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986/1995, Carston 1998, 2002) holds that all implicatures are derived 
by the same comprehension strategy, and contextual assumptions are 
equally fundamental to any type of pragmatic inference process.  
As discussed by Katsos and Cummins (2010), experimental 
evidence appears to disfavour the strong default position: there are 
indications that scalar implicatures are generally effortful to recover, 
and are not generated at all in cases where they are contextually 
irrelevant. However, to demonstrate that GCIs are not default 
inferences is not the same as demonstrating that GCIs and PCIs are 
generated by the same mechanism. Here we ask the further question 
whether GCIs and PCIs are obtained in the same way, or, to put it 
another way, whether generalised and ad hoc scales are processed in 
the same way as potential sources of implicature. 
3. Scalar implicature and the localist-globalist distinction 
Another point of contention between competing theories of SIs 
concerns the locus of the inference. Grice’s original proposal held that 
implicatures are conveyed by the speaker’s failure to make a more 
informative statement than they actually made. This permits the 
hearer to draw the inference that the more informative statement 
could not be made, because the speaker is not in a position to make it 
while remaining cooperative. Hence, the inference is drawn post-
propositionally.  
However, in widely-discussed examples such as (1a) and (2a), 
cited here from Russell (2006), implicatures seem to arise locally – that 
is, at a sub-propositional level. The corresponding (b) and (c) items are 
the candidate implicatures in each case. 




(1)  a. George believes that some of his advisors are crooks. 
b. George believes that not all of his advisors are crooks. 
c. George does not believe that all of his advisors are crooks. 
(2)  a. Every student passed some of the tests.  
b. Every student passed some but not all of the tests. 
c. Not every student passed all of the tests. 
In each case, the standard Gricean process can derive the (c) 
implicature: these statements are simply the negations of the stronger 
alternatives to (a), “George believes that all of his advisors are crooks” 
and “Every student passed all of the tests” respectively. However, it 
has been argued that it is also possible to interpret these utterances as 
conveying the (b) implicatures, which appear to require local 
derivation. Furthermore, these implicatures are stronger than their (c) 
counterparts, which they asymmetrically entail.  
On the strength of these and similar data, some accounts of scalar 
implicature take a localist stance, and predict that (1a) and (2a) should 
be interpreted with the local implicature, as expressed by (1b) and (2b) 
respectively. Such accounts typically also commit to a default view of 
scalar implicature, although these are in principle independent 
considerations. 
In a similar vein, it has been observed (by Levinson and others) 
that implicatures appear in some cases to enter into the truth-
conditions of the proposition which gives rise to them. This is also 
impossible on the traditional Gricean account. Establishing the 
presence of these aspects of meaning in the truth-conditions of the 
proposition is a sensitive issue: however, one commonly accepted 
criterion is passing the Scope Test, according to which only aspects of 
meaning that can be part of what is denied or supposed, or generally 
fall within the scope of logical operators, are truth-conditional.  
Carston (2004) discusses the history of this approach.  Under this 
criterion, widely cited examples such as (3a-c) have convinced 
Levinson (2000: 198ff), Green (1998) and others that scalar 
implicatures can intrude into truth conditions. 
(3)  a. It is better to eat some of the cake than it is to eat all of it. 
b. You shouldn’t be too upset about failing some of your exams; it’s much 
better than failing the whole lot. 
c. Because the police have recovered some of the gold, they will no doubt 
recover the lot. 
According to these analyses, the scalar implicature (that “some” 
signifies “some but not all”) must fall within the scope of logical 
operators in the above examples in order for the constructions to be 
felicitous. Since this is not compatible with the classical Gricean 
account, it appears that some kind of encapsulated default-pragmatic 




system must be involved in generating these inferences that are 
neither semantic nor fully pragmatic. 
However, Chierchia (2004) and Horn (2004), among others, doubt 
that these examples show intrusion into truth-conditions per se. They 
argue that what is involved is post-propositional accommodation of 
the inference, which is triggered retrospectively once the sentences 
following the scalar terms are processed in order to avoid a 
contradiction. Horn (2004) further suggests that the extraordinary 
nature of this process is indicated by the requirement for focus 
intonation on the scalar term (an observation which is also part of 
King and Stanley’s (2006) account; see also Geurts (2009)). 
Localism does not necessarily take a position on whether SIs can 
intrude upon truth conditions: it only makes predictions with regard 
to the domain (sub- or post-propositional) in which pragmatic 
principles may operate. It is also conceivable to detach localism from 
defaultism: a local but non-default theory, in which SIs are generated 
locally but are context-dependent, is in principle coherent. However, 
these two claims have tended to go hand-in-hand in the literature 
(notably for Levinson, and perhaps even for Chierchia). 
4. Experimental investigations 
Carston, Levinson, Chierchia and Sperber and Wilson all consider that 
their accounts of scalar implicature should enjoy psycholinguistic 
validity, and Levinson and Sperber and Wilson’s accounts are 
explicitly motivated by cognitive considerations. Hence their 
predictions about the nature of SI generation should be empirically 
(dis)confirmable (Levinson 2000: 5, 81, 162ff, 370; Chierchia 2004: 51, 
68, 93; Carston & Powell 2006 for the Relevance Theory perspective). 
Here, following the pattern of Katsos and Cummins (2010), we review 
the empirical evidence which has been brought to bear on the 
questions under discussion in this paper: generalised versus ad hoc 
scales, and localism versus globalism in the generation of SIs. 
4.1. SI generation from generalised and ad hoc scales 
The comparison between generalised and ad hoc scales as a source of 
scalar implicature was studied by Papafragou & Tantalou (2004). They 
examined whether Greek participants reject under-informative 
utterances with three types of scale: the generalised lexical quantifier 
scale <some, all>, scales that rely on encyclopaedic world-knowledge 
such as <cheese, sandwich>, and ad hoc scales that are evoked only in 
specific contexts (e.g. <{parrot}, {doll}, {parrot and doll}>). The critical 
utterances in these cases are those which are ‘strictly speaking’ true 
but which have the potential to give rise to false implicatures to the 
effect that the stronger term of the scale does not hold. The task was 




oriented towards young children, addressing in particular the claim 
(typical of default accounts) that children acquire the implicatures of 
context-independent generalised scales sooner than the truly Gricean 
particularised implicatures of context-dependent scales. 
In their experiment, adults and 5-year-old children were presented 
with act-out scenarios in which a puppet would receive a reward if 
(s)he performed a task which involved achieving the stronger term of 
the scale, e.g. if (s)he managed to colour all of the stars, to eat the 
sandwich, or to wrap up the presents (the parrot and the doll). The 
puppet went away and performed the action hidden from the 
participant’s view, and then came back to report that (s)he had 
achieved something less than the goal that was set, by saying e.g. “I 
coloured some of the stars”, “I ate the cheese”, “I wrapped the 
parrot”. The participants were then asked to decide whether or not 
the puppet should receive the reward. 
For each critical under-informative condition, the adults always 
withheld the reward.  The children withheld the reward in over 70% 
of the trials, and they were able to justify their response on the 
grounds that the puppet did not complete the task. Numerically, 
children were more sensitive to violations with ad hoc scales than 
with logical or encyclopaedic scales (withholding the reward in 90%, 
77.5% and 70% of cases respectively), but this difference did not reach 
statistical significance. The authors interpreted their data as 
supportive of context-driven models of pragmatics, in that the reward 
is withheld at comparable levels regardless of whether or not the 
contrast scale was generalised. 
However, in interpreting these findings, it is necessary to sound 
notes of caution. The experimental design is atypical within the 
literature. In a typical task involving under-informative utterances, 
participants who do not detect that an utterance is under-informative 
should be able straightforwardly to accept the utterance, while 
participants who detect the under-informativeness should be able to 
reject the utterance. In Papafragou and Tantalou’s task, the picture is 
less clear.  If the puppet is taken to be informative, participants should 
withhold the reward, because they can infer that the task has not been 
completed. However, if the puppet is understood to be under-
informative (e.g. “I wrapped the parrot” is interpreted as “I wrapped 
the parrot, and it is possible that I also wrapped the doll”), then 
participants are again entitled to withhold reward, as they have no 
way of knowing with certainty whether the task actually has been 
completed. Therefore the grounds for withholding reward are 
potentially ambiguous, which undermines the results of the study, 
although it must be noted that the justifications given by participants 




are consistent with the informative interpretation of the utterances, 
which suggests that the findings are indicative. 
Based on this study, Katsos & Bishop (2011) investigated the same 
question using the standard paradigm for sentence evaluation tasks. 
In this paradigm, participants watch the situation unfold, and can 
therefore tell whether or not an utterance is under-informative for the 
actual situation. Katsos & Bishop looked at 5-, 7-, 9- and 11-year-old 
English-speaking children as well as adults. Corroborating the 
findings of Papafragou & Tantalou (2004), they demonstrated no 
advantage for generalised scales in the child groups.  Indeed, the 
numerical tendency of Papafragou & Tantalou’s study attained 
significance in this study: under-informative utterances with ad hoc 
scales were rejected at higher rates than under-informative utterances 
with generalised scales.  This result is clearly not predicted by default 
accounts, but nor is it supported by context-dependent accounts, 
which predict a uniform pattern of development for all scales. 
A further challenging finding of Katsos & Bishop (2011) concerned 
the adult group.  While adults always objected to under-informative 
utterances with generalised and ad hoc scales at ceiling rates, an 
indirect, qualitative advantage for generalised expressions over ad 
hoc ones was obtained.  That is, rejections of under-informative 
utterances were of two different types: first, straightforward 
rejections, and second, indirect rejections, phrased as revisions, 
hedging remarks, ambivalent judgments or metalinguistic comments 
(“Yes, but he painted the heart as well”; “This was half right, half 
wrong”; “It’s not false, but he missed something”, “This one is 
tricky!”, “This is technically correct”).  While 15% of the adult 
objections to under-informative utterances with ad hoc scales were 
indirect, over 40% of the adult objections to under-informative 
utterances with ad hoc scales were indirect.  If we were to take the 
straightforwardness of the response (ranging from straightforward 
rejection to a metalinguistic remark such as “technically correct”) as 
an index of how participants treat underinformativeness, we could 
interpret this as evidence that adults treat violations of 
informativeness with generalised scales as graver than violations with 
ad hoc scales. 
To recap, Katsos & Bishop (2011) obtained differences between 
context-independent generalised expressions on the one hand and 
context-dependent ad hoc expressions on the other, with children’s 
performance on ad hoc expressions proving better than that with 
generalised expressions.  These findings stand against default 
accounts that consider inferences which involve generalised scales to 
be linguistically and psycholinguistically privileged.  However, the 




findings cannot readily be explained by context-driven accounts 
either, as these predict no difference between expressions.  Moreover, 
Katsos & Bishop demonstrated a qualitative advantage for generalised 
expressions over ad hoc ones in the adult data.  Thus, they arrived at a 
picture that is not predicted by any of the existing theories. 
One suggestion for explaining the child data is to focus on the kind 
of violations that were evoked for the specific generalised and ad hoc 
scales tested.  In this methodology, when a speaker is under-
informativewith regard to the generalised quantifier scale, they are 
correct about the type of object acted upon (e.g. carrots rather than 
pumpkins), but miss out information on the quantity of objects (some 
rather than all).  Thus, the speaker has met some of the informativity 
requirements (kind of objects) but failed others (quantity of objects).  
However, when a speaker is under-informativewith regard to the ad 
hoc scale, they miss out information both on how many objects were 
acted upon and on the identity of one of the objects.  A child who 
considers it important to give information first and foremost about the 
kind of objects that were acted upon might plausibly tolerate the 
former kind of underinformativeness while rejecting the latter.  The 
difference between scales that was obtained may be due to the fact 
that younger children seem first and foremost to be focused on 
avoiding and objecting to violations about the kind of objects. 
A related suggestion is that young children may have been 
interpreting the wh-questions asked in this experimental paradigm as 
pertaining to general situations rather than specific events.  A generic 
reading of the question may bias young children towards the 
acceptance of specific indefinite phrases such as “some of the carrots”, 
since it has been shown that young children do not have adult-like 
competence in mapping bare and modified noun phrases to generic 
and specific readings in English (Gelman & Raman, 2003; Pérez-
Leroux, Munn, Schmitt & DeIrish, 2004). 
Turning to the adult group, we note that the pattern of privileged 
treatment is reversed.  The indirect privilege of the generalised scale 
can be interpreted in two ways: either this reflects the special status of 
generalised scales in the linguistic system (as per default accounts), or 
this is due to some other factor.  As default accounts were not upheld 
for the child groups, we would need to postulate some non-obvious 
reason why these accounts should in any case apply for adults.  Other 
factors might include an effect of frequency of contrast: in actual 
language use, “some” is clearly far more often contrasted with “all” 
than, for instance, “the triangle” is contrasted with “the triangle and 
the heart”.  This may explain why the privileged status of generalised 




scales is manifest only in the adults, this being the group with the 
greatest exposure to language. 
Horn’s (1984; see also 2004) non-default account of implicature and 
informativeness might be compatible with this explanation.  He 
proposes that the contexts in which terms of a generalised scale are 
contrasted with one another are quantitatively more numerous than 
the contexts in which the terms of an ad hoc scale are contrasted.  
Thus, context-independent generalised scales are associated not with 
default implicatures, but with default contexts of occurrence.  This 
account is compatible with the data presented here, if we assume that 
the adults’ far richer experience with language and contexts of use 
makes them, unlike the children, sensitive to this special property that 
the terms of a generalised scale possess. 
Another suggestion, with regard to the effect of expression, is that 
we should focus our attention on how the sets that are relevant for the 
evaluation of informativeness are composed.  Generalised scales 
consist of natural sets, in the sense that they comprise a collection of 
one kind of items (e.g. carrots).  Ad hoc scales, by contrast, rely on sets 
that comprise different kinds of items, which do not form natural 
collections.  While care was taken by Katsos & Bishop (2011) not to 
create odd collections for ad hoc scales (e.g. using a computer and a 
desk – both office items – or a triangle and a square, both shapes), 
there is an intuitive sense in which these collections of items are still 
looser than a collection of same-type items, e.g. five carrots.  If this is 
indeed the case, one way to account for the difference between child 
and adult data is to attribute it to differences in the way children and 
adults treat set membership, a matter which is outside the purview of 
linguistic theory.  It is possible to test whether the composition of sets 
interacts with adult and child informativeness: for example, one could 
investigate the behavior of ‘in-between’ types of scales, relying on 
widely held encyclopaedic knowledge (e.g. <roof, house>, <chapter, 
book>).  These scales do not exhibit the logical properties of the 
quantifier scale, but their members are more strongly associated than 
are the members of the ad hoc scales.  Thus, it may be predicted that 
adults, who may be more sensitive to the naturalness of set 
composition, will treat these scales like the quantifier scales, while 
children will treat these scales like the ad hoc scales. 
In summary, the differences between generalised and ad hoc 
expressions are not simply a matter of the degree of context-
dependence or independence of the contrast that is evoked.  The 
literature on underinformativeness has not, thus far, considered the 
other factors that may come into play, such as the potential effects 
arising from the degree of naturalness of the sets involved, a 




preference for kind-readings, or difficulty with mapping indefinite or 
bare noun phrases to generic situations.  It is not impossible that 
further investigations will reveal that the observed differences in child 
and adult performance with generalised and ad hoc expressions is in 
fact attributable to factors orthogonal to the question of whether the 
scale is or is not available in context-dependent fashion. 
 4.2. The locus of SI generation 
Recall from examples (1) and (2) above that, when scalar expressions 
are embedded under belief operators or the universal quantifier, 
global post-propositional and localist sub-propositional accounts 
derive different implicatures, with the localist implicatures being 
stronger than the global ones. 
Localist accounts such as Chierchia’s (2004, 2006) argue that the 
occurrence of local implicatures is a grave challenge for global 
accounts.  Globalists have addressed this challenge in three ways.  
According to Russell (2006) and Geurts (2009), one can consider the 
instances brought forward by the localists one by one, and argue in 
each case whether these involve true implicature generation or some 
other process.  (This is similar to Chierchia’s and Horn’s responses to 
cases cited in Levinson such as (3) above.)  For instance, the global 
account can derive local SIs if some non-arbitrary assumptions are 
taken into account.  In the case of examples such as (1), repeated 
below, Russell (2006) provides an account of the derivation of the 
“local” implicature (1b). 
(1) a. George believes that some of his advisors are crooks. 
b. George believes that not all of his advisors are crooks. 
c. George does not believe that all of his advisors are crooks. 
According to Russell, the local SI could be derived by the addition 
of the assumption that George is epistemically adept, or at least biased 
towards his beliefs.  That is, George could be supposed to take a 
stance and either believe that something is the case or believe that it is 
not the case; that is, we exclude the possibility that he simply does not 
believe it to be the case.  With regard to the proposition that all 
George’s advisors are crooks, the global implicature (1c) is compatible 
with two situations, one in which George does not believe that all his 
advisors are crooks and one where he believes that it is not the case 
that all his advisors are crooks (this latter equating to the situation in 
(1b)).  The addition of the assumption that George is opinionated 
about his beliefs rules out the situation in which George does not 
believe that all his advisors are crooks, and allows only the situation 
in which George believes it is not the case that all his advisors are 
crooks.  Ergo, a global implicature augmented with assumptions 
about the interlocutor’s epistemic stance can generate what looks like 




a local implicature.  The process that generates the SI, however, is 
fully Gricean. 
However, besides these responses, it is possible to cast doubt upon 
the very foundations of the localist challenge.  Geurts and 
Pouscoulous (2009a, b) have been asking whether local implicatures 
are actually as readily available as has been assumed.  To investigate 
this, they presented participants with embedded and un-embedded 
instances of propositions with the existential quantifier, as in (4a) and 
(4b).  They then asked participants to respond to the corresponding 
questions (4a’) and (4b’). 
(4) a. Fred heard some of the Verdi operas. 
b. Betty thinks that Fred heard some of the Verdi operas. 
a’. Would you infer from this that Fred didn’t hear all the Verdi operas? 
b’. Would you infer from this that Betty thinks that Fred didn’t hear all the 
Verdi operas? 
While the localist account predicts equal rates of acceptance for 
(4a’) and (4b’), the global account predicts that participants will be 
much more prone to accept (4a’) than (4b’).  This is indeed 
documented by Geurts and Pouscoulous, for whom participants show 
evidence of unembedded SIs at rates of 93% but embedded SIs only at 
50%.  Moreover, they found that the rates of local implicatures vary 
substantially between conditions: while the rates of generation are as 
high as 50% for embedding under “think”, they are as low as 3% for 
embedding under the universal quantifier. 
These findings seem clearly to indicate that local implicatures are 
not derived with the consistency expected by local accounts.  In fact, 
bearing in mind that the local implicature under “think” can be 
derived using a global process of inference, as proposed by Russell 
(2006), the evidence from embedding under “every” suggests that 
there may be no truly local SIs, as predicted by global accounts. 
Of course, it should further be remarked that these investigations 
are disconfirming the local account without necessarily providing 
positive evidence for the global one.  They do not investigate whether 
participants are generating the global implicature (which is also 
predicted by the global account, just as much as it is predicted that 
there should not be local implicatures), nor do they show that the 
apparent instances of local implicature do not arise through authentic 
scalar implicatures.  While the former can easily be tested with the 
existing paradigm, simply by asking participants whether the global 
SI follows from (4b), addressing the latter question is perhaps less 
straightforward.  
 




5. Overview and outlook 
In the previous sections we reviewed empirical investigations of 
aspects of scalar implicature that have been motivated by debates in 
the theoretical literature.  With respect to the question of how 
speakers and hearers use generalised and ad hoc scales to draw scalar 
inferences, we observe a confusing pattern of experimental findings: 
children reject more under-informative utterances with ad hoc scales, 
while adults seem to consider informativity violations with 
generalised scales more serious. As discussed in section 3, this is a 
finding that is hard to accommodate on any account of scalar 
implicature, and some of the factors contributing to the findings may 
not relate to the debate on scale types that the investigations set out to 
address. With respect to the locus of SI generation, we discussed 
empirical evidence that the ‘local’ embedded SIs are inferred with 
much less frequency than the ‘global’ non-embedded SIs, and that in 
many cases the former are apparently not available to participants at 
all. 
It is worth reiterating that not all context-driven or default 
accounts take (or need to take) a position with regard to these issues. 
It is possible to have a local account without assuming defaultness (in 
the sense of independence from discourse context), or vice versa. 
Similarly, it is evident that neither default nor context-driven accounts 
can encompass the experimental findings on the use of generalised 
versus ad hoc scales, at least not without making additional claims 
about the nature of adult and child processing of set membership, the 
participants’ understanding of the experimental tasks in question, or 
some other matters. Although we have seen how various different 
methodologies may be gainfully employed when we come to 
operationalise competing theoretical proposals, we must remain 
vigilant that the responses of participants are in fact conditioned by 
the variables that we wish to test. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, we see that the relationship 
between concept and experiment is a productive one, as far as scalar 
implicature is concerned. Clear predictions at a theoretical level 
motivate empirical study, and the drive towards empirical 
investigation motivates clarity at a theoretical level. Moreover, critical 
evaluation of the nature of responses to experimental stimuli can 
broaden our theoretical base by suggesting the relevance of additional 
factors in actual linguistic contexts, and thus rendering these 
additional factors amenable to theoretical formalisation. For scalar 
implicature, as for many topics in semantics and pragmatics, the 
collaboration of theorist and experimentalist appears set to pave the 
way for future progress at both levels. 
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